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punishment is not supported.
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1.  Introduction
Typically, metropolitan taxi drivers and their passengers are involved in one-shot games. This
is especially true in the interaction with non-local passengers, who will most probably not
meet any cab driver more than once. Generally, the taxi driver not only has an informational
advantage over the passenger, but also a bargaining advantage, since the passenger’s cost of
quickly finding a different means of transportation is often prohibitively high. Given these
advantages and the one-shot nature of the game, we should expect to find taxi drivers practi-
cally dictating the terms of trade to passengers almost all of the time. This seems to be the
reason why so many municipal authorities issue strict codes of conduct for taxi operators and
attach severe sanctions to the breach of these rules. However, if even the slightest cost or
effort is involved for the plaintiff in the legal action against cheaters, we should not observe
any such punishment action initiated by passengers in such one-shot games. Yet, casual ob-
servation suggests that cheated passengers often do spend the cost and effort that is needed to
report corrupt cab drivers to the authorities
1.
The cheated taxi passenger is just one of many examples in which economic agents may
actually choose a costly punishment action, without receiving an immediate monetary reward
and without expecting to build a personal reputation that pays off in the long run. The choice
of the action in such cases seems to be based on one of three motives: an intrinsic desire for
justice, the enjoyment of overt punishment, or some form of strategic group reputation
building. In terms of economic modeling, the former corresponds to the punisher’s positive
utility of punishing cheaters, regardless of the effect this punishment may or may not have on
later payoffs. This can be referred to as the fairness aspect of punishment behavior. The sec-
ond motive addresses the emotional satisfaction a punisher may have from knowing that
cheaters know why and when they are brought to justice. In contrast to the first case, the
punisher has a positive utility of punishing only if the punishment is overt and immediate (i.e.
if the cheaters can unambiguously connect the punishment to this special case of their wrong-
doing). The third motive corresponds to punishers caring about future payoffs of the group as
a whole, perhaps also hoping that a more favorable “social environment” may enhance their
own future payoffs, even if the direct effect on their own payoffs is negative. Obviously, this
describes the public good aspect of punishment behavior, since “teaching” cheaters to “be-
have well” is a costly action that is taken to the benefit of the other group members. Testing
for these three competing rationales of punishment behavior in naturally occurring one-shot
games is practically impossible, because motives generally remain unobservable, even if data
on choices and outcomes were accessible.
In this paper, we report an economic experiment that allows us to compare the three compet-
ing motives of (costly) punishment action: the resistance to unfairness, the enjoyment of overt
                                                
1  One of the authors, for example, has a record of repeatedly spending the time and the effort needed to provide
this public good.2
punishment, and the contribution to group reputation. A no-feedback (covered response)
treatment, in which overt punishment and group reputation building is impossible, is con-
trasted with a baseline full-feedback (open response) treatment. Since the experimental game
is repeated in a number of consecutive rounds with new opponents, the dynamics of group
reputation building can be identified in the behavior observed in the baseline treatment.
For the sake of simplicity, the interaction in our experiment takes part within the framework
of the well-known ultimatum game. In this game, one player (the proposer, male pronouns)
offers a second player (the responder, female pronouns) a division of a fixed cake. The re-
sponder can either accept or reject. If she accepts, the proposed division is implemented, if
she rejects, both receive nothing. The subgame perfect equilibrium is straightforward: the re-
sponder does not reject any positive offers, since even the smallest positive payoff is better than
receiving zero. In anticipation of this, the proposer offers no more than the smallest money unit
and the responder accepts. Hence, under the common knowledge of rationality, the proposer
virtually grabs the whole cake for himself.
Interestingly, and just as in the taxi example, observed behavior is different than theory pre-
dicts under the assumption of fully rational players, who are only motivated by their own
monetary rewards. A large experimental literature, starting with GÜTH, SCHMITTBERGER, and
SCHWARZE (1982), has focused on this simple bargaining game. In almost all studies, dra-
matic deviations from the subgame perfect prediction are observed
2. Typically, responders
turn down small offers (a form of costly punishment) and proposers offer substantial amounts
of money (very often up to an equal division of the cake).
Why do responders reject when this just means leaving money on the table? Such behavior is
quite obviously not rational, if subjects are only concerned about own payoffs and the game
is played only once. But, perhaps players do not only care about their own payoff, but also
about the fairness of the outcome. In that case, they may reject low offers, because the rejec-
tion creates an allocation in which the proposer also receives nothing. In other words: Re-
sponders are willing to pay the price of receiving nothing, because of their inherent resistance
to unfairness (THALER 1988).
A number of models have recently been presented that incorporate inherent fairness motives
of economic agents in different ways, these include the models by BOLTON (1991), RABIN
(1993), DUFWENBERG and KIRCHSTEIGER (1998), BOLTON and OCKENFELS (2000), and FEHR
and SCHMIDT  (1999). In these models, players are both concerned about their own payoff and
the fairness of the outcome. Fairness is defined in various ways, but is always based on dis-
tributional issues and/or interaction history. The common denominator of these models is that
they all apply standard methods of game theory to the interaction of agents with modified
utility functions, i.e. incorporating some form of fairness utility. Generally, a remarkably
                                                
2  Surveys on ultimatum game experiments can be found in GÜTH (1994), ROTH (1995), and CAMERER and
THALER (1995).3
good fit of model predictions to experimental data is reported by the authors. But, the players
in these models are concerned about fairness only in a static manner. Dynamic considerations
of decision making, which could motivate punishment behavior as an investment for future
payoffs, are not modeled by these authors.
 3
The notion of punishment as an investment in future payoffs, however, gains some credibility
when looking at another striking experimental observation: Although responders in ultima-
tum game experiments leave some money on the table by rejecting low offers, on average,
their payoffs are much higher than in subgame perfect equilibrium play. This means that it is
not necessarily only a fairness motive that is driving rejection behavior. Some kind of mone-
tary motive may also be involved. In repeated play settings, such results are readily explained
in terms of reputation building super-game strategies.
4 In the one-shot setting of the ultima-
tum game, however, reputation building is not possible, at least not on an individual level.
5
Both the proposer and the responder know that they will not meet and interact again.
While reputation on individual level cannot explain the success of responders in receiving
relatively high average payoffs in the ultimatum game, perhaps reputation on group level can.
If the population of responders has a group reputation for being “tough” (i.e. for rejecting
low offers), then proposers fearing rejections may increase their offers and, thus, drive
responders’ payoffs up.
6 In this sense, the group reputation can be a public good for the
population of responders and each individual responder can contribute to this public good by
rejecting low offers.
There are good reasons to believe that responders will engage in the provision of the public
good  “group reputation”. First, there is abundant empirical evidence on the voluntary
provision of public goods.
7 Second, a number of experiments by social psychologists show
that the provision public goods is substantially higher when the benefits go to an in-group,
where an in-group can be any group of people that share a group identity – even if this
                                                
3  However, there are a number of papers that look at the dynamic aspect of the issue using learning models. For
example, ROTH and EREV (1995) show that an adaptive learning model (based purely on the adaptation of
choices to past outcomes) can produce simulation paths that exhibit some of the features of ultimatum game
outcomes without reference to fairness utilities and/or (explicit) reputation. In the long run, however, the simi-
larities between simulation paths and observed behavior are lost. Furthermore, ABBINK, BOLTON, SADRIEH, and
TANG (2001) find that simple adaptive learning models cannot completely account for responder motivations. They
show that many responders not only care about their own payoffs, but also about the payoff received by the pro-
poser. To incorporate more sophisticated behavioral structures, adaptive learning models have been enhanced in a
number of ways, e.g. EREV and ROTH (1998) and CAMERER and HO (1999).
4  Reputation effects have been show to be decisive to outcomes in quite a number of experiments, for example:
the borrower-lender game studied by CAMERER and WEIGELT (1988), the simple signaling game studied by
BRANDTS and HOLT (1992), the centipede game studied by MCKELVEY and PALFREY (1992), and the chain-
store game studied by JUNG, KAGEL, and LEVIN (1994).
5  GNEEZY and STOLER (1998) show that in a one-shot situation, social punishment behavior can be observed
next to personal revenge.
6 Along similar lines, WINTER and ZAMIR (1996) suggest that observed ultimatum game behavior may be driven
by some form of  population rationality.
7 For a survey see LEDYARD (1995).4
identity is induced arbitrarily by the experimenter.
8 In the case of the ultimatum game, any
experimenter can confirm that the responders quickly develop a strong in-group feeling of
being the unlucky underdogs. It is not hard to imagine that the strong group identification can
lead to acts of solidarity, even if the individuals have no immediate contact to one-another.
The fundamental open question we address with this work is whether responders’ rejection
behavior is driven by fairness motives, by the visibility of punishment to proposers, or by the
desire to provide a public good, namely group reputation. Our experimental results strongly
suggest that responders’ behavior is motivated both by a pure fairness motive, i.e. by the
resistance to unfairness, and by the desire to create a more profitable interaction environment
by contributing to their group’s reputation. The hypothesis that rejections may be driven by
the enjoyment of the visibility of the punishment, however, finds no support in our data.
2.  Game
We use a reduced version of the ultimatum game, similar to what BOLTON and ZWICK (1995)
introduced as the cardinal ultimatum game, or what GALE, BINMORE, and SAMUELSON (1995)
refer to as the ultimatum minigame. In our game, the proposer is restricted to two alternatives:
the equal split (5,5) or a division favoring himself (8,2). The responder cannot reject the equal
split. She can, however, reject the unequal offer, in which case both players receive nothing.
Compared to the standard ultimatum game, the reduced version used here allows simpler data
analysis. All relevant data appear in one number for each role: subjects’ behavior is expressed
in rates of equal offers and responder rejection rates only. Previous experimental studies
(BOLTON and ZWICK 1995, ABBINK, BOLTON, SADRIEH, and TANG 2001) have shown that the
reduced form ultimatum game captures the most relevant ultimatum game characteristics.
Each subject plays eight rounds of the game, all rounds in the same role (proposer or re-
sponder). Subjects are matched using a revolving (or round-robin) matching scheme, such
that each proposer meets each responder only once and vice versa.
The game we use in the experiment is depicted (in extensive form) in figure 1. It is the same
for the open and the covered response treatment. In the open response condition, the proposer
is informed of the responder’s choice immediately after each round. In contrast, in the cov-
ered response condition the responder’s choice is not reported to the proposer immediately.
Only after the session is completed (i.e. after all eight rounds are played), proposers in the
covered response treatment are informed about their earnings. From this information, they
can derive how many times they have been punished, but not when and by whom.
The round-robin matching mentioned above is particularly important for the control condition
with open responses. (To ensure compatibility, the same matching scheme is also used in the
                                                
8 See, for example, DAWES, VAN DE KRAGT, and ORBELL (1988).5
covered response treatment.) Due to the revolving matching scheme, a responder never meets
the same proposer more than once, thus she cannot punish a proposer in the hope of getting a
better offer from him in later rounds. Punishing a proposer, however, may have positive ex-
ternal effects on those other responders who meet the punished proposer in later rounds.
Figure 1
3. Hypotheses
The first hypothesis we test is that of resistance to unfairness, captures the motivational as-
sumptions underlying fairness utility models. In these models dynamic considerations are
irrelevant. Only the fairness of the final outcome - next to the own payoff - enters players’
utility or evaluation functions. Since the responders have exactly the same choices and influ-
ence the final allocation in exactly the same way in both treatments, the distribution of final
allocations should be indistinguishable in both treatments. Especially, the fact that the pro-
posers in the covered response treatment are not informed on who punished them when
should not make a difference for the choices the responders make.
Hypothesis 1 (Resistance to Unfairness). Rejections are motivated by the fairness of the
final outcomes. No difference in rejection rates between the covered and the open response
treatment are expected.
The second hypothesis addresses a group reputation motive. Responders contribute to their
group’s reputation for being “tough” by punishing proposers who make unfair offers. Since a
proposer faces a much greater damage after the rejection of a low offer than the rejecting












“tough” group of responders. Thus, the rejection of low offers can educate the proposer. In a
“meet only once” context, the rejection is not meant to enhance the rejecting responder’s pay-
off immediately by educating the particular proposer for later occasions when the two meet
again. Instead, educating proposers is a system of mutual contributions to a public good,
namely to the group reputation.
Obviously, group reputation can only be built up in the open treatment. This means that more
rejections should be observed in the open treatment than in the covered treatment. But, as the
experiment proceeds, the positive external effect of punishment decreases, because fewer and
fewer encounters are left in which responders can profit from previous educative rejections
by their fellow group members. Hence, if group reputation is the predominant motive of
punishment behavior, then we should expect rejection rates to decline in the open treatment
towards the end of the experiment. In the last round, there should be no difference between
the open and the covered treatment.
Hypothesis 2 (Contribution to Group Reputation). Rejections are motivated by group
reputation considerations. No rejections are expected in the covered response treatment. In
the open response treatment, high rejection rates are expected in early rounds. These rates
are expected to decline towards the end of the experiment, as the advantage of the group
reputation diminishes.
The third hypothesis addresses an emotional aspect of rejection behavior.
9 On the one hand,
responders who are confronted with unfair offers might enjoy the overt and immediate pun-
ishment that is possible in the open treatment. On the other hand, when punishment is veiled
and delayed as in the covered treatment, rejecting unfair offers is conjectured to cause no
such enjoyment. This means that if the enjoyment of overt punishment is effective, then re-
jection rates must be higher in the open than in the covered response treatment. However, the
proposed effect is static, so that rejections rates should not be expected to decline towards the
end of the experiment. Note, that this difference in the predicted development of the rejection
rates distinguishes the hypotheses 2 and 3.
Hypothesis 3 (Enjoyment of Overt Punishment). Rejections are motivated by enjoyment of
immediate punishment. No rejections are expected in the covered response treatment, be-
cause proposers making unfair offers cannot be punished overtly and immediately. In the
open response treatment, high rejection rates are expected throughout the experiment (con-
stant across all rounds).
                                                
9 When we started with this project we had not considered this motive. The notion of the enjoyment of overt
punishment was put forward by several seminar participants on a number of different occasions. We thank all
those who suggested this idea.7
4. Experimental procedure
The experiments were computerized, with software developed using RatImage (ABBINK and
SADRIEH 1995). The game was presented to the subjects in the game tree form, where the
decisions were submitted by buttons at the branches of the tree. After a decision, the chosen
branch was highlighted, the other ones lowlighted. In the open response treatment, the re-
sponder’s choice and the resulting payoffs were immediately marked on the proposer’s
screen. In the covered response treatment, the proposer’s screen only displayed a question
mark between the two possible outcomes of that branch.
Six sessions of each treatment were conducted, with a total of 192 subjects. The experiments
were run in the RatioLab at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and in the Laborato-
rium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn, Germany. In a two-
country experiment, the fact that the subjects in different countries are drawn from distinct
subject pools must be taken into account. Differences in behavior might arise from country-
specific cultural environments, but also from a different composition of the subject pools with
respect to educational background, gender, age, majors of study, and others. In fact, in the
four country study by ROTH, PRASNIKAR, OKUNO-FUJIWARA, and ZAMIR (1991), the Israeli
subjects’ behavior was slightly different from behavior in the other countries. In Jerusalem,
lower offers and a higher tendency to accept low offers were observed in the ultimatum
game. Thus, the possibility of subject pool differences must be taken into account. We con-
trolled for this possibility by splitting the two treatments between the two locations evenly.
Three sessions of each treatment were run in each laboratory. Hence, if subject pool differ-
ences should exist, they cannot be in conflict with treatment differences.
All subjects were volunteers and were only given monetary incentives. The sessions started
with an oral presentation of the written instructions (about 10 minutes) that were handed out
to the subjects (reproduced in appendix A). The sessions were conducted in the local lan-
guage of each country. Much care was taken to ensure that the instructions were equivalent in
both countries. The instructions were first written in English and then translated into each
local language by a member of the local laboratory team. In the next step, another team
member translated the translation back into English, without seeing the original English text.
This procedure was repeated until the back-translation and the original text had converged.
Convergence, however, was reached rather quickly, since a very neutral and technical phras-
ing was used. The same method was applied to the screen output, which was also displayed in
the local language of each country. The main decision screens are reproduced in appendix A.
The social composition of the two subject pools was similar, since both laboratories are lo-
cated in social science buildings and both subject pools mainly consisted of students of social
sciences. The exchange rates of points to cash were adjusted in the two countries in a way
that total earnings were comparable, in terms of teaching assistants’ average hourly wage
rates at each location. The exchange rate of DM 0.50 (roughly US-$ 0.33 at that time) per8
point was used in Bonn, and NIS 0.75 (about US-$ 0.25 at that time) was used in Jerusalem.
Since the experiments were short (about 30-45 minutes in total), the resulting payoffs were
on average well above the typical student’s per hour wage.
5.  Results
First, we focus on the responder behavior. We begin with the analysis of aggregate rejection
rates over the sessions. The raw data of the experiment are reproduced in appendix B.
5.1.   Responder rejection rates
Table 1 shows the average overall rejection rates (rejected unequal offers to total unequal
offers) in the six sessions of each treatment, ordered from the lowest to the highest. The Jeru-
salem sessions are marked with a plus sign (+), the Bonn sessions with an asterisk (*).
Table 1.  Average rates of rejected unequal offers in each session (in percent)
Covered 6.5
+ 17.6* 22.7
+ 26.1* 31.0* 31.3
+ avg. over all covered = 22.5
Open 10.0
+ 20.0* 40.0* 43.5* 50.0
+ 80.0
+ avg. over all open = 40.6
The rejection rates show that, even when the response is not reported to the proposer (covered
treatment), almost one quarter of all unequal offers are turned down. This supports hypothesis
1, since responders exhibit resistance to unfairness that is entirely independent of all consid-
erations of own monetary payoff maximization. Responders cannot openly punish proposers
in the covered response treatment - not even as a group - in order to receive higher payoffs
later. Thus, the relatively high average rejection rate (22.5%) is evidently motivated by nega-
tive emotions towards unfair actions or distributions. The disutility of unfair outcomes that in
some way or another is contained in all fairness utility models can be interpreted as a for-
malization of such a motive.
Observation 1.  In the covered response treatment, substantially positive rejection rates are
observed. This supports hypothesis 1 (resistance to unfairness).
However, resistance to unfairness cannot explain a different aspect of our data. There is a sig-
nificant difference in the rejection rates of the two treatments. The average rejection rate in the
open response sessions is 40.6 percent, which is about 75% higher than those of the covered
treatment. The difference is significant with a p-value of 0.090 (one-tailed), according to the
Mann-Whitney U-test applied to the average rates of rejection in sessions.
10 The pronounced
                                                
10 Fisher’s two-sample randomization test yields a p-value of 0.058 (one-tailed).9
difference between the rejection rates of the two treatments is consistent both with hypothesis 2
and with hypothesis 3.
Observation 2.  In the open treatment, unequal offers are rejected significantly more often
than in the covered treatment. This is consistent with hypothesis 2 (contribution to group
reputation) and with hypothesis 3 (enjoyment of overt punishment).
Observation 2 reveals that next to the resistance to unfairness some other motive for rejecting
unfair offers must be present in the open treatment. Comparing the aggregate rejection rates
only does not allow a differentiation between the group reputation and the overt punishment
motives of hypothesis 2 and 3. In order to make such a distinction, we must take a closer look
at the development of the rejection rates. While the enjoyment of overt punishment motive
(hypothesis 3) predicts rejection rates in the open treatment not to show a trend over experi-
mental time, it is consistent with the group reputation motive (hypothesis 2) that these rates
decline, eventually reaching the level of rejections in the covered treatment.
Figure 2 shows the aggregate rejection rates over the eight rounds of the experiment. The
differences between the rejection rates across treatments diminish towards the end of the
session: in the last two rounds, when contributing to group reputation makes little or no
sense, almost no difference between the treatments can be observed. Statistical tests of the
last round rejection rates do not detect any significant treatment differences. This supports
hypothesis 2, but is not in line with hypothesis 3.
Figure 2
The fact that average rejection rates get closer to one another is mainly due to the tendency of
the rejection rates in the open response treatment to fall over time. From the first to the sec-











































29.1% in the open response treatment. The decrease is significant at p = 0.015, according to
the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test, applied to the difference of rejection rates be-
tween the first and the second half of the experiment in the six independent sessions. In con-
trast, the rejection rates in the covered response treatment fall only slightly (from 24.2% to
21.4%), and the decrease is not significant. The corresponding numbers for the single ses-
sions are shown in table 2.
Table 2.  Rejection rates in the first and the second half of the experiment























































over all 0.40 0.29 ￿0.11 0.25 0.21 ￿0.04
*= Bonn session       
+= Jerusalem session
Observation 3. In the covered treatment, no trend can be detected in responder rejection
rates. In the open treatment, responder rejection rates fall significantly from the first to the
second half of the experiment, reaching the level of rejections in the covered treatment in the
last round. This supports hypothesis 2 (contribution to group reputation), but is not in line
with hypothesis 3 (enjoyment of overt punishment).
The three observations above lead to the following conclusion: The fairly stable rate of rejec-
tions in all rounds of the covered response treatment reflects a basic rate of rejections due to
resistance to unfairness in our subject pool. The higher rates of rejection in the early rounds
of the open response treatment appear to incorporate some amount of rejections motivated by
group reputation in addition to the basic rate of rejections due to resistance to unfairness.
5.2.  Rates of equal offers
In figure 3, the round by round aggregate rates of equal offers are depicted. Table 3 shows the
session averages of the rates of equal offers, ordered from the smallest to the largest. Again,
Jerusalem sessions are marked with a plus sign (+), and Bonn sessions with an asterisk (*).
In the covered response treatment, we observe equal offers in half of the cases (49.8 percent),
which is about 40% higher than the 35.7 percent in the open response treatment. Aggregated
over all eight rounds, the difference across treatments is significant at p = 0.026 (one-tailed),
according to the Mann-Whitney U-test, applied to average rates of equal offers in the sessions.11
Figure 3
Already in the very first round, we observe a higher rate of equal offers in the covered re-
sponse treatment. 70.8% of the proposers choose an equal offer in the first round, whereas
50.0% do so in the open response treatment. According to Fisher’s exact test, this difference
is significant at p = 0.019 (one-tailed). Note that the individuals’ equal offers are independent
in the very first round of the experiment.




+ 54.7* 64.1* avg. over all covered = 49.8
Open 21.9* 21.9* 21.9
+ 28.1* 43.8
+ 76.6
+ avg. over all open = 35.7
Observation 4.  The rates equal offers are significantly higher in the covered response
treatment than in the open response treatment.
Note that the rates of equal offers in the covered response treatment are significantly higher
than in the open treatment, although the rejection rates of unequal offers are lower. It seems
plausible that the high rates of equal offers in the covered response treatment are due to an
enhanced risk avoidance of the proposers. If a proposer makes an unequal offer, his payoff
can vary between 0 and 8, depending on the responder’s choice. In contrast, he is guaranteed
a payoff of 5 when making an equal offer. Thus, if the proposer believes that there is a posi-
tive probability for some responders to reject the unequal offer, the payoff on the right branch
is uncertain, with an unknown probability, whereas the payoff on the left branch is certain.
To explain the discrepancy in proposers’ early rounds behavior across treatments, the fol-
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ment tend to test responders’ propensity to reject by selecting the unequal offer branch.
Learning from success and failure, however, is completely impossible for proposers in the
covered response treatment. It seems that the lack of feedback increases the tendency to avoid
risk and leads to the significantly higher rates of equal offers in all rounds of the covered
response sessions.
5.3.  Is group reputation effective?
Given that responders in the open response treatment use punishment to building up a group
reputation for being “tough”, the question arises whether their attempt is successful. Do early
rejections actually induce proposers to shy away from the unequal offer, because of the ex-
pectation of punishment? If the answer is “yes”, then we should observe increased rates of
equal offers in those proposer populations that faced the highest rejection rates. For each
session, we examine the rejection rates in the first half of the experiment and the change in
the rate of equal offer from the first to the second half. We compute the correlation of these
two measures over the sessions. If group reputation building is effective, then a tendency for
high first half rejection rates to be followed by high increases in the rate of equal offers
should be observed.
Figure 4 shows that, in fact, there is a strong correlation in the predicted direction. The greater
the responders’ reluctance to accept unfair offers, the greater is the rise in the frequency of equal
offers with time. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient of rs = 0.93 is significantly different
from zero at  = 0.05 (one-tailed). Thus, high frequencies of rejections correlate to higher in-
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in the open treatment13
We now examine whether the positive correlation between rejection rates and the change in
the rates of equal offers can be detected on an individual level. To see this, we check each
round in which a proposer switches from a preceding round’s unequal to a current round’s
equal offer. We count how often the equal offer was made after the last round’s unequal offer
was rejected, and compare this to the frequency of equal offers following an accepted
unequal offer. If proposers were successfully educated with rejections, then we should
observe systematically more switches after punishments than after accepted unequal offers.
Figure 5 shows that the group reputation building is actually effective on the individual level.
Observing a rejection, i.e. being punished, influences the proposers’ behavior. Proposers’
propensities to choose the equal offer is rather low if their unequal offer in the last round was
accepted (relative frequency 11.4%). But, if punished, their tendencies to switch is almost
four times higher (relative frequency 44.3%). This is consistent with the hypothesis that pro-
posers in the open response treatment attempt to test the probability of rejection and switch to
the equal offer if that probability is perceived as high.
Figure 5
The observed pattern of switches points in the same direction in all six sessions of the open
response treatment. Table 4 shows the frequencies of switches after punishments and after ac-
cepted unequal offers. The last column shows the difference between the relative frequencies of
switches. In all six sessions this measure has a positive value. Thus, a switch occurs relatively
more often after rejected than after accepted unequal offers. The matched-pair sign test rejects
the null hypothesis that a switch is equally likely after punishment as after an accepted unequal
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Σ 35 79 16 140 +0.33
Observation 5.  In the open treatment, proposers tend to switch to the equal offer signifi-
cantly more often after having observed a rejection than after accepted unequal offers.
After having switched to an equal offer, proposers often switch back. Of all equal offers, 46%
are followed by an unequal offer. Thus, although proposers do react to punishment, they also
show a strong tendency to switch back to the unequal offer. This implies that high rejection
rates are necessary for a sustained group reputation effect on the responders side. Interest-
ingly, the frequency of switching from the equal to the unequal offer is almost the same in
both treatments: under the covered condition we observe a relative frequency of 47%.
5.4.  Are contributions to group reputation profitable?
We have found evidence that contributions to the group reputation are effective in the sense
that proposers are influenced towards making more equal offers, after having observed rejec-
tions. However, since rejections are costly for the responders, the effectiveness of such edu-
cative punishment does not immediately imply that such behavior is profitable for responder
populations. In this section, we analyze how rejection rates and responder profits are distrib-
uted over the populations.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the rejection rates in a session and the average re-
sponder payoff (in per cent of the cake) in that session. The numbers are computed on the
basis of all eight rounds of the session. If contributing to the group reputation is profitable,
then we should observe higher responder payoffs in the sessions with high rejection rates.
The correlation between responder payoff and rejection rates seems to be U-shaped rather
than monotonously rising or falling. It seems that the more extreme patterns of behavior are
more profitable than those in between. Contributing to the group reputation seems to be prof-
itable only if the rejection rates are sufficiently high to induce a strong effect. Where the
rejection rates are intermediate, the responders pay the price for punishment, but the fre-
quency of unequal offers is not sufficiently decreased to compensate the costs of punishment.
To illustrate this point, we have included the vertical line into the figure. At a rejection rate of15
0.375, expected payoff maximizing proposers are exactly indifferent between the equal and
the unequal offer. Rejection rates close to that line are least profitable for the responder
populations. The very low and especially the very high rejection rates are preferable for pay-
off maximizing responder populations. However, it should be noticed that the data basis is
too small to provide clear statistical evidence for this effect.
Figure 6
5.5.  Do contributions to group reputation increase efficiency?
Efficiency in our context can simply be understood as the total payoff gained by responders
and proposers in a session together. Obviously every rejection reduces the total payoff in a
round. The efficiency loss, in points, is exactly the absolute overall number of rejections in a
session, multiplied by the cake size of 10. On the other hand, if the proposers are successfully
educated by high early rejection rates to increase the number of equal offers, the total number
of rejections of a session may be small, since the absolute number of unequal offers is re-
duced. Hence, if the effect of early punishment is strong enough, then high rejection rates in
the beginning of a session need not necessarily lead to less efficiency than in a session with a
constant moderate rate of unequal offers and rejections.
In figure 7, average proposer payoffs are depicted on the x-axis and the average responder
payoffs on the y-axis. The dots mark the average responder and proposer payoffs in the ses-
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diagonal lines are iso-efficiency lines. Different points on the same iso-efficiency line repre-
sent allocations with the same efficiency, but a different distribution between proposers and
responders. It can be seen that not only the average responder payoff, but also efficiency is
lowest with intermediate rejection rates. The highest efficiency is achieved in the session with
the lowest rejection rate, where, evidently, most of the efficiency gain is extracted by the
proposers. Thus, high rejection rates have a similar effect on efficiency as on responder pay-
offs. If rejection rates are intermediate, then the contributions to group reputation are too
small to outweigh the efficiency losses caused by the rejections. However, we must once
again point out that the data basis is small and no conclusive inference can be drawn.
Observation 6.  The highest responder payoffs and the highest efficiency are observed in the
sessions in which rejection rates are either very low or very high.
Figure 7
Finally, in figure 7, it can immediately be noticed that efficiency in the covered treatment is
greater than in the open treatment. This is due to the lower rejection rates coinciding with
higher rates of equal offers. The difference is significant at p = 0.017 (one-tailed) according
to the Mann-Whitney U-test applied to the average per round total payoff in the single inde-
pendent sessions.
6.  Summary and Conclusions
We conducted an experiment using a simple ultimatum game. Our two-treatment design
enabled us to separate a base rate of rejections motivated by responders’ resistance to unfair-







































tation building. We find no support for the hypothesis that rejections are motivated by the
enjoyment of overt punishment.
In our open response treatment, the responder’s choice was reported to the proposer, while it
was not reported in the covered response treatment. Rejection rates in the covered response
treatment - with an average of 23.3% - were considerable. Since rejections in the covered
response treatment can neither have been motivated by individual nor group reputation
building, we conclude that the high rejection rates in these sessions are due to the responders’
inherent resistance to unfairness. This result is completely in line with the central assumption
of fairness utility models, such as those suggested by BOLTON  (1991), RABIN  (1993),
DUFWENBERG and KIRCHSTEIGER (1998), BOLTON and OCKENFELS (2000), and FEHR and
SCHMIDT (1999).
The significant difference in rejection behavior across treatments, however, is not compatible
with any of the mentioned fairness utility models. We observed a significantly higher rate of
rejections in the open response treatment than in the covered response treatment. Therefore,
we conclude that rejections in the open response treatment are not only motivated by re-
sponders’ resistance to unfairness, but also by some other motive.
One possible additional motive for rejections in the open treatment can be that responders are
contributing to their group’s reputation for being “tough”. In the context of our experiment, in
which each responder met each proposer only once, building an individually profitable
reputation was impossible. But, by building a group reputation for rejecting unfair offers, the
group of responders attempted and managed to influence the behavior of the group of
proposers in the direction of more equal offers.
A different explanation for the higher rejection rates in the open response treatment is that
overt and immediate punishment is more enjoyable than veiled and delayed punishment.
Since the proposer making an unfair offer was immediately informed of the responders
reaction in the open response treatment, such an enjoyment of overt punishment should have
led to a sustained higher rate of rejections than in the covered treatment.
The dynamics of rejection behavior provided more evidence for our conclusion. The average
per round rejection rates in the open response treatment decreased in the last rounds of each
experimental session. In the very last rounds, these rates actually approached the average
rejection rate of the covered response treatment, which stayed around 23% and exhibited no
time trend. Since the enjoyment of overt punishment should be expected to be stable across
rounds, but the value of group reputation declines as the experiment proceeds, we take our
results to be supportive of the group reputation hypothesis.
Group reputation in one sense is effective. When facing a group of “tough” responders,
proposers tend to make equal offers significantly more often than when facing “compliant”
responders. But, although proposers react to punishment as expected, only extreme rejection
behavior actually leads to higher profits for the responders. In other words, responders fare18
best, either if they are markedly compliant or if they are very strict in rejecting unequal
offers. The responder groups that only occasionally reject unfair offers, end up paying more
for these rejections than they gain from the positive reactions of the proposers. Thus,
rejecting unequal offers is always effective, but is not always profitable or efficient. Building
a “tough” group reputation only pays, if enough unequal offers are rejected early on.
Finally, we observe that significantly more equal offers are made by proposers in the open
than in the covered treatment. Our conjecture is that proposers in early rounds of the open
treatment “test” responders’ reactions to unequal offers. In the covered treatment, such testing
is not possible. This seems to explain the significantly higher number of unequal first round
offers in the open compared to the covered response treatment.
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Appendix A.  The Written Instructions
Player Types:
There are two types in the experiment: player 1 and player 2.
After the introduction, each participant draws one of 16 cards.
The drawn card defines the terminal number of the participant.
The terminal number determines the participant's type for the whole experiment.
Structure:
The experiment consists of eight rounds.
In each round 8 pairs of participants are formed:
each pair with one player 1 and one player 2.
In every round, every player 1 meets a different player 2, and vice versa.
Thus, no participant meets the same participant a second time.
The participants are not allowed to speak with each other during the experiment.
Decisions:
Each round begins with player 1 choosing one of two alternatives: Left or Right.
Player 2 is informed about the choice of player 1.
If player 1 chooses Left, the round ends.
If player 1 chooses Right, player 2 chooses one of two alternatives: Left or Right;
player 1 is not informed about the choice of player 2;
then the round ends.
Profits in Points:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 receives Player 2 receives
chooses Left has no choice 5 5
chooses Right chooses Left 8 2
chooses Right chooses Right 0 0
The Question Mark:
If player 1 chooses Right, he will only see a question mark on the screen: since he will
  not be informed about the choice of player 2, he will neither know his own profit,
nor the profit of player 2.
After the last round of the experiment all participants will be informed of their total
profits, but the players 1 will not be informed of the value of each received ?
separately.
Exchange Rate:
Each point earned in the experiment is equivalent to 50 Pfennigs / 75 Agorot.21
The Decision Screen for Player 1
Player 1 chooses one of his al-
ternatives by clicking the corre-
sponding mousebutton on the
screen, or by pressing the corre-
sponding key on the keyboard
("L" for "Left", "R" for "Right",
resp.).
The Decision Screens for Player 2
If player 1 has chosen "Left",
then player 2 is informed about
player 1's choice, but has no own
decision to make.
If player 1 has chosen "Right",
then player 2 chooses one of his
alternatives by clicking the cor-
responding mousebutton on the
screen, or by pressing the corre-
sponding key on the keyboard
("L" for "Left", "R" for "Right",
resp.).22
Appendix B:  The Data
Session 1: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11R 15R | 13R  3L |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17L  6  | 12R  5L | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11L  3  | 13R  1R |  8R  9R | 14R  6L | 17L  5  | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1R | 13R  9R |  8L  6  | 14L  5  | 17R  7L | 12R 16L | 18L 15  |
4 |  2L  1  | 11L  9  | 13R  6L |  8L  5  | 14R  7L | 17L 16  | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  8R  7L | 14L 16  | 17L 15  | 12L  3  | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  8R 16L | 14R 15R | 17R  3L | 12L  1  | 18L  9  |
7 |  2L  5  | 11L  7  | 13L 16  |  8L 15  | 14L  3  | 17L  1  | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13L 15  |  8R  3L | 14R  1R | 17R  9R | 12L  6  | 18L  5  |
Session 2: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11L 15  | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14L  9  | 17L  6  | 12L  5  | 18L  7  |
2 |  2L 15  | 11L  3  | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14L  6  | 17L  5  | 12L  7  | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1R | 13R  9L |  8R  6L | 14L  5  | 17R  7L | 12R 16L | 18R 15L |
4 |  2R  1R | 11L  9  | 13L  6  |  8R  5R | 14L  7  | 17L 16  | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5R |  8R  7R | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12R  3R | 18L  1  |
6 |  2L  6  | 11L  5  | 13L  7  |  8L 16  | 14R 15L | 17L  3  | 12L  1  | 18R  9L |
7 |  2L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R 16L |  8R 15L | 14R  3R | 17R  1L | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2L  7  | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8L  3  | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12L  6  | 18L  5  |
Session 3: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11L 15  | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17L  6  | 12L  5  | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14R  6L | 17L  5  | 12L  7  | 18R 16L |
3 |  2R  3L | 11R  1L | 13L  9  |  8R  6R | 14R  5R | 17L  7  | 12R 16R | 18R 15L |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13L  6  |  8L  5  | 14R  7L | 17L 16  | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  8R  7L | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12L  3  | 18R  1L |
6 |  2L  6  | 11R  5R | 13R  7L |  8L 16  | 14L 15  | 17L  3  | 12L  1  | 18L  9  |
7 |  2R  5R | 11R  7L | 13L 16  |  8L 15  | 14L  3  | 17R  1L | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12R  6R | 18R  5L |
Session 4: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15R  4L | 11L  2  | 13L  3  |  9R  1L | 14R  8L | 16L  6  | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15L  2  | 11R  3L | 13L  1  |  9R  8R | 14R  6L | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4L |
3 | 15R  3L | 11L  1  | 13R  8L |  9R  6L | 14R  5R | 16R  7L | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15L  1  | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9R  5R | 14R  7R | 16R  4L | 12R  2L | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8R | 11L  6  | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14R  4L | 16L  2  | 12R  3L | 10R  1R |
6 | 15R  6L | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  9R  4L | 14R  2L | 16R  3L | 12R  1R | 10L  8  |
7 | 15L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9R  2L | 14R  3L | 16R  1R | 12R  8R | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11R  4L | 13R  2L |  9R  3L | 14R  1R | 16R  8L | 12R  6L | 10L  5  |
Session 5: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9R  1L | 14L  8  | 16L  6  | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2R | 11R  3R | 13R  1L |  9R  8L | 14R  6L | 16L  5  | 12R  7L | 10L  4  |
3 | 15L  3  | 11L  1  | 13R  8R |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7L | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9R  5L | 14R  7R | 16L  4  | 12R  2R | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14L  4  | 16R  2R | 12L  3  | 10L  1  |
6 | 15L  6  | 11L  5  | 13R  7R |  9L  4  | 14R  2L | 16L  3  | 12R  1L | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R  4R |  9L  2  | 14R  3L | 16L  1  | 12L  8  | 10L  6  |
8 | 15R  7R | 11R  4R | 13R  2L |  9L  3  | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10L  5  |
Session 6: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9L  1  | 14L  8  | 16R  6R | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9L  8  | 14R  6L | 16L  5  | 12R  7L | 10L  4  |
3 | 15L  3  | 11L  1  | 13R  8L |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7R | 12R  4L | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9L  5  | 14L  7  | 16L  4  | 12R  2L | 10L  3  |
5 | 15L  8  | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9L  7  | 14L  4  | 16R  2L | 12R  3L | 10L  1  |
6 | 15R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16R  3L | 12R  1L | 10L  8  |
7 | 15L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9L  2  | 14R  3L | 16R  1L | 12R  8L | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11L  4  | 13R  2L |  9L  3  | 14R  1L | 16L  8  | 12R  6L | 10L  5  |23
Session 7: Open, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11R 15L | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17R  6L | 12R  5R | 18R  7L |
2 |  2R 15R | 11R  3R | 13R  1R |  8R  9L | 14R  6L | 17R  5R | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1L | 13L  9  |  8R  6L | 14R  5R | 17R  7L | 12R 16R | 18R 15R |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13R  6L |  8R  5R | 14R  7L | 17R 16R | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5R |  8R  7L | 14R 16R | 17L 15  | 12R  3R | 18R  1L |
6 |  2R  6L | 11R  5L | 13L  7  |  8R 16R | 14R 15L | 17R  3R | 12L  1  | 18R  9L |
7 |  2L  5  | 11R  7L | 13L 16  |  8R 15L | 14R  3R | 17L  1  | 12L  9  | 18R  6L |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16R | 13L 15  |  8R  3R | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12L  6  | 18R  5R |
Session 8: Open, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11R 15L | 13R  3L |  8L  1  | 14L  9  | 17L  6  | 12R  5L | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11R  3R | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14R  6L | 17R  5L | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2R  3L | 11R  1L | 13R  9L |  8R  6L | 14R  5R | 17L  7  | 12R 16R | 18L 15  |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13R  6L |  8R  5L | 14L  7  | 17R 16L | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11R  6R | 13R  5R |  8R  7L | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12R  3L | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6R | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  8R 16R | 14R 15L | 17R  3R | 12R  1L | 18R  9L |
7 |  2R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R 16R |  8R 15L | 14R  3L | 17L  1  | 12R  9L | 18R  6L |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12R  6L | 18R  5L |
Session 9: Open, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11R 15L | 13L  3  |  8R  1L | 14L  9  | 17R  6R | 12R  5L | 18R  7R |
2 |  2R 15L | 11L  3  | 13R  1L |  8R  9L | 14R  6R | 17R  5L | 12R  7R | 18R 16L |
3 |  2R  3R | 11R  1L | 13R  9L |  8R  6R | 14L  5  | 17R  7R | 12R 16R | 18L 15  |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9R | 13R  6R |  8R  5L | 14R  7R | 17R 16L | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11L  6  | 13R  5L |  8R  7R | 14L 16  | 17R 15L | 12R  3L | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6R | 11R  5L | 13R  7R |  8R 16R | 14L 15  | 17R  3R | 12R  1L | 18L  9  |
7 |  2R  5L | 11R  7R | 13R 16L |  8R 15L | 14R  3L | 17R  1L | 12R  9L | 18R  6R |
8 |  2R  7R | 11L 16  | 13L 15  |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17R  9L | 12R  6R | 18R  5L |
Session 10: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15R  4L | 11L  2  | 13L  3  |  9R  1L | 14L  8  | 16R  6R | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2R | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9R  8R | 14L  6  | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4R |
3 | 15R  3L | 11R  1R | 13R  8L |  9R  6L | 14R  5R | 16R  7L | 12R  4R | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8R | 13R  6R |  9L  5  | 14R  7R | 16R  4R | 12R  2R | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8R | 11L  6  | 13L  5  |  9L  7  | 14L  4  | 16L  2  | 12L  3  | 10R  1L |
6 | 15R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  9R  4L | 14L  2  | 16R  3R | 12L  1  | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5R | 11L  7  | 13R  4R |  9R  2R | 14L  3  | 16L  1  | 12R  8L | 10R  6L |
8 | 15R  7L | 11L  4  | 13L  2  |  9R  3L | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10R  5R |
Session 11: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3R |  9R  1R | 14L  8  | 16L  6  | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3R | 13L  1  |  9L  8  | 14L  6  | 16R  5R | 12R  7R | 10L  4  |
3 | 15R  3R | 11L  1  | 13L  8  |  9R  6R | 14L  5  | 16L  7  | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1R | 11L  8  | 13R  6L |  9L  5  | 14R  7R | 16L  4  | 12L  2  | 10L  3  |
5 | 15L  8  | 11L  6  | 13R  5R |  9R  7R | 14L  4  | 16L  2  | 12L  3  | 10L  1  |
6 | 15L  6  | 11L  5  | 13L  7  |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16L  3  | 12L  1  | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5R | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9L  2  | 14L  3  | 16L  1  | 12L  8  | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11L  4  | 13L  2  |  9L  3  | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10L  5  |
Session 12: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9R  1R | 14L  8  | 16R  6L | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9L  8  | 14R  6L | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4L |
3 | 15R  3L | 11R  1R | 13R  8L |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7R | 12R  4L | 10R  2L |
4 | 15R  1L | 11L  8  | 13R  6R |  9R  5L | 14L  7  | 16R  4L | 12R  2L | 10R  3L |
5 | 15R  8L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14L  4  | 16R  2L | 12R  3L | 10R  1L |
6 | 15L  6  | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16R  3L | 12R  1R | 10R  8L |
7 | 15R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R  4L |  9R  2L | 14R  3L | 16R  1L | 12R  8L | 10R  6L |
8 | 15R  7L | 11R  4L | 13R  2L |  9R  3L | 14R  1R | 16R  8L | 12R  6L | 10R  5L |
Legend:
Each line represents one round of the session. Each column stands for one match. For exam-
ple,  “15 R   4 L“ reads: terminal 15, proposer, chose Right, terminal 4, responder, chose Left.